【Author’s Note】
This article was first published in Chinese by The Mirror Post Forum on October 18, 2026, under the title 〈對抗中國跨國鎮壓 歐盟經驗可以攻錯〉. To deepen discussion in Taiwan and abroad on transnational repression and victims’ fundamental rights, the author subsequently revised parts of the text and supporting references and prepared the English version, “Countering Transnational Repression: EU Lessons for Taiwan,” for publication on the Victim Support Taiwan (VST) website. Comments and corrections are warmly welcome.
As Taiwan confronts an escalating campaign of transnational repression (TNR) from China, ramping up national security measures and criminal prosecutions is no longer enough. Taiwan must also draw lessons from the European Union and establish a legal framework firmly centered on victim protection. At its core, transnational repression works by targeting a few people to weaponize fear, intimidate entire communities, and silence others from speaking out. Protecting victims and strengthening societal resilience are therefore critical to any effective strategy for countering transnational repression.
The Long-Standing Threat of TNR in the EU
The European Union has long faced TNR from multiple authoritarian states, in part because of its open and interconnected geopolitical environment. According to the European Parliament study Perpetrators and Methods of Transnational Repression and Possible Counter-Strategies (PE 775.286), published in January 2026 at the request of its Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), Russia accounts for the largest number of documented cases of TNR within the EU. Its tactics have evolved from deploying state agents to poison political dissidents to recruiting individuals through online platforms such as Telegram to carry out attacks. Meanwhile, beyond luring and abducting dissidents to third countries for execution, Iran also outsources assassinations and intimidation to transnational criminal networks. In one of the most high-profile and brazen cases, Belarus scrambled a fighter jet to force an EU civilian airliner passing through its airspace to divert and land, allowing security agents to board and arrest a dissident journalist.
The European Parliament study and subsequent resolutions have also identified China as operating one of the world’s most sophisticated, comprehensive, and systematic systems of TNR. Compared with the more direct and lethal violence associated with Russia and Iran, China has often relied on a combination of non-lethal, less visible tactics in democratic societies, including surveillance, coercion, legal pressure, and United Front political influence. These tactics include using campaigns such as Operations Fox Hunt and Sky Net to conduct extralegal actions and pressure individuals into returning to China; operating unauthorized “overseas police stations” to monitor Chinese communities in EU countries; harassing family members in China as a form of coercion by proxy; pressuring universities and cultural institutions to halt Taiwan-related research or cancel Taiwan-related events; and asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction under Hong Kong’s National Security Law and China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress to target overseas advocates with high-value bounties, arrest warrants, and threats of lifelong prosecution or punishment.
The European Parliament Embraces a Victim-Centred Approach
Building on the study’s recommendations, the European Parliament adopted its resolution on Countering Transnational Repression – Towards an EU Strategy to Protect Europe’s Sovereignty and Democratic Values (P10_TA(2026)0203) on June 16, 2026. In paragraph 4, the Parliament defines TNR as “deliberate acts or threats carried out by states, including repressive or authoritarian regimes, state-affiliated entities or entities subject to the influence of, or pressure from, a state, or its proxies, to defend and advance their interests by reaching across borders to intimidate, threaten, silence, coerce, control or harm in any other way individuals or groups living abroad, or their support networks and family members.” The resolution also calls on the European Commission, the Council, and Member States to adopt a common EU definition of TNR based on that formulation and to integrate it across EU policy and legal instruments.
More recently, on October 7, the European Parliament adopted its recommendation on EU–China Political Relations (P10_TA(2026)0334), explicitly citing the investigation launched by China against Taiwanese legislator Puma Shen Pao-Yang as an example of cross-border repression. The Parliament voiced strong disapproval of China’s TNR activities and the extraterritorial application of Chinese law, while also calling for stronger human rights protections, greater European resilience and sovereignty, and deeper cooperation with Taiwan.
I had the opportunity to see this victim-centred approach in practice while taking part in the “Human Rights Connected” Lee Ming-che European Democracy Advocacy Tour. Under the theme “The Evolution of China’s Transnational Repression: Lessons from the Lee Ming-che Case,” our delegation traveled to Berlin and Brussels from October 7 to 16, meeting with Members of the European Parliament, members of the Belgian Parliament, and international organizations. Throughout these meetings, we saw strong interest in Lee Ming-che’s experience as a victim of repression and in the broader strategies needed to counter TNR. The discussions gave us a concrete sense of how a victim-centred approach can shape policy and practice.
It must be clarified that TNR, as an integrated legal concept, remains an emerging challenge worldwide. While the EU has accumulated extensive practical experience, it has not yet enacted a single, dedicated legal instrument specifically targeting TNR. Yet the absence of a standalone law does not mean the EU lacks the tools to counter it. In practice, relevant protections are already embedded across several existing areas of EU law and policy.
First, regarding crime victim support, under the Victims’ Rights Directive (Directive 2012/29/EU), as amended by Directive (EU) 2026/1472 in June 2026, whenever a specific act of TNR constitutes a criminal offense and causes a victim to suffer physical, mental, or emotional harm or economic loss, the victim can directly access the EU victims’ rights protection framework. Victims can then access tailored protection services based on their individual needs, safety risks, and intersectional vulnerabilities.
Second, the EU has long maintained the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, which provide a policy framework for emergency support and protection for advocates facing elevated risks. Within its immigration and asylum systems, the EU upholds the principle of non-refoulement, applies visa flexibility measures, safeguards against the abuse of Interpol notices, and provides judicial review, shielding exiles targeted by TNR during border controls and extradition proceedings.
Meanwhile, in countering non-physical TNR, the EU has developed a dedicated policy toolbox and the Rapid Alert System for Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). The Digital Services Act (DSA) provides tools to address systemic risks to fundamental rights on very large online platforms, including aspects of coordinated harassment and disinformation. The European Parliament has further called on digital platforms to establish rapid-response mechanisms for people at risk, including responses to doxxing, account takeovers, and coordinated online harassment. Journalists, academics, and others targeted through abusive litigation may also benefit from protections under the Anti-SLAPP Directive.
In other words, the EU is not starting from scratch. It is increasingly connecting existing protections in the fields of victims’ rights, human rights defenders, migration and asylum, digital regulation, and countering foreign interference with the emerging challenge of TNR, while also considering more targeted legal and policy tools to address the gaps that remain.
Building Taiwan’s Legal Framework Against TNR
Drawing lessons from the EU’s journey from fragmented legal tools toward an integrated strategy, Taiwan should prioritize four key pillars in building its own legal framework against TNR:
1. Establish a formal mechanism for identifying victims of TNR.
TNR often operates through covert and disguised tactics, including surveillance and secret photography by private investigators, staged traffic accidents, paint or excrement attacks, property damage, and arson. Perpetrators and local proxy networks may also launch disinformation campaigns and social harassment, mocking victims’ attempts to seek help as “paranoia” and portraying them as responsible for their own suffering. If frontline law-enforcement authorities fail to recognize the TNR dimension behind these acts and treat them merely as isolated minor offenses, the state may unwittingly become part of the mechanism that enables the perpetrators. Taiwan should therefore draw on the victim identification mechanism under Article 11 of the Human Trafficking Prevention Act and establish a confidential, efficient, and credible legal and administrative process for identifying victims of TNR. It should also develop risk indicators to guide frontline law-enforcement officers and help the public recognize possible cases of TNR.
2. Provide effective and sustained victim protection measures.
Once a victim is identified, a secure, confidential, and trauma-informed interagency team should tailor protective measures to the specifics of the case and the individual’s needs. Within a comprehensive protection framework, these measures must include counter-surveillance and cybersecurity defenses, specialized legal assistance to combat smear campaigns, disinformation, and abusive lawsuits, psychological trauma support, relocation assistance, and emergency financial relief. Crucially, family members residing in Taiwan or abroad must also be brought into this safety net; substantive protection must continue for as long as the danger persists. For legislative models, Taiwan can build upon its existing domestic statutes—including the Crime Victim Rights Protection Act, the Stalking and Harassment Prevention Act, and the Domestic Violence Prevention Act.
3. Empower victims to participate in policy-making and share their lived experiences.
Victims of TNR should never be viewed merely as passive recipients of state protection; those who have endured persecution understand best how threats unfold and how fear spreads. While strictly safeguarding their physical security, privacy, and personal wishes, the legal and institutional framework should invite victims and targeted communities to participate in law enforcement training, public education, policy planning, and institutional evaluation. When policymakers and the broader public learn directly from victims’ lived experiences, they are better able to understand how TNR operates and how authoritarian regimes manipulate fear and social pressure. This can strengthen trust and mutual support across society and harness victims’ agency to neutralize TNR’s strategic objective of intimidating society and spreading fear.
4. Build legal and institutional mechanisms for cross-border cooperation and information sharing.
TNR crosses national borders, while authoritarian governments learn from one another, cooperate, and at times rely on transnational criminal networks and local proxies to exert pressure. Democratic protection networks must therefore also operate across borders. Taiwan and its international partners should develop shared case-classification standards, establish databases on TNR incidents, and create regular mechanisms for exchanging information on tactics, emerging risks, and prevention strategies. Taiwan, the EU, and like-minded democracies should forge substantive cross-border intelligence-sharing and victim-protection alliances among governments, parliaments, legal experts, crime victim support organizations, and human rights NGOs, solidifying the international frontline of democratic defense.
At its core, TNR attacks the few to silence the many. The EU’s experience shows that an effective legal framework must operate on two tracks at the same time: stopping perpetrators and protecting victims. Reducing the ability of perpetrators to carry out TNR is essential, but so is ensuring that victims remain safe and able to speak. Only by institutionalizing victim protection and sustaining victims’ capacity to exercise agency can democratic societies weaken the chilling effect of TNR and build the resilience needed to withstand external threats.
